UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES DIVISION CV06-2085

 NOTE: The complaint was filed on April 6, 2006.  This is the First Amended Complaint.

and official Capacities )

_____________________Defendants )

 

 I. JURISDICTION

1. This is a complaint for injunctive relief and specific performance based on civil rights violations and intentional neglect committed by the COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA and its officers, district attorneys, employees and or agents. This case is brought pursuant to 42, U.S.C. §§ 1983, 18 U.S.C., PART I, CHAPTER 13 Sec. 241, 28 U.S.C. 1343(a). Federal jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331. The court has supplemental jurisdiction over state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)

II. VENUE

2. The claims alleged herein arose from events and/or omissions occurring in the County of Santa Barbara. Therefore, venue lies in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, LOS ANGELES DIVISION. (28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2)

III. INTRODUCTION

3. This case arises from the County of Santa Barbara's alleged absent district court records and the Plaintiff CHRISTOPHER BROWNS attempts to use state courts to force the county to comply with state laws of record keeping. To show the pattern and policy, or the intent of Defendants conduct, the history of Santa Barbara Counties actions depriving a citizen of rights for 9 years prior to CO Plaintiffs involvement are summarized.

 4. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant, in order to evade compliance with state laws of record keeping, and in retaliation against Plaintiff Christopher Brown for his attempted use of 14th Amendment rights, defendants are conducting a conspiracy through deprivation of and against citizens rights beginning May 16, 1997 under color of law TITLE 18 U.S.C., PART I, CHAPTER 13 Sec. 241. The conduct deprived Plaintiff BROWN of equal protection of law in nearly any form, also depriving him of medical information, treatment and economic recovery from fraud, repeatedly engaging in egregious and outrageous misuse of its governmental powers. This conduct extends to the district attorneys office child support division conspiring with members of the judiciary, conspiring with the public defender, conspiracy in disguise on the highway, the sheriffs department and county council interfering with subpoenaed witness and evidence, failure to appear on subpoena, permitting and suborning perjury, tampering with the court transcripts and due process, providing false legal counsel; depriving the plaintiff of equal protection of law, TITLE 42, U.S.C. Sec. All this subjecting the plaintiff to fraud, impoverishing him, causing his eviction and rendering him medically impossible to diagnose correctly, preventing his medical treatment or acquisition of legal counsel. Currently defendants are seeking to render plaintiff criminal through contempt charges in the administrative family law courts for his failure to comply with an order to pay child support after defendant has suspended plaintiffs drivers license.

5. At issue is whether the awesome powers of law enforcement, the judiciary and prosecutorial agencies of Santa Barbara are being used for legal and ethical ends, or whether these agencies have, in this and other previous cases, used the power of the state for corrupt and self serving ends, to oppress those individual persons, and classes of persons, that might attempt to use the legal systems to gain lawful performance from local governments.

 6. Plaintiff CHRISTOPHER BROWN brings this legal action to obtain injunctive relief as protection from misuse of state powers, federal intervention into state matters, and specific performance from the defendants to gain relief from injustice and medical information/treatment as needed, according to state government code, as his only recourse for medical treatment and protection under law from being eventually rendered criminal by the defendants of SANTA BARBARA COUNTY as he simply lives his life, trying too avoid being damaged any further than he already is and to seek treatment for damage done.

 7. CO plaintiffs have a claim to specific performance relating to deprivations of medical information from civil rights violations in this case of a citizen and the inherent value of medical information a citizen subpoenaed or requested with the FOIA. The legal actions of a citizen met with corrupt, self serving evasion of duty instead of equal protection of law from a municipality while trying to secure a safer environment for his/her children with medical information and CO plaintiffs were deprived of those benefits.

8. Defendants have generally violated the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 14141§ 14141. or Cause of action by the US Attorney for complaint, (a) Unlawful conduct for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was violated when equal protection of law was not provided in the Defendant COUNTY's courts or through its officers and because of that, all Plaintiffs children were collectively deprived of medical treatments protecting them and greatly improving their conditions of health, mental health, rehabilitation and training.

 9. With the protection of law, Plaintiff BROWNs actions would have reasonably lead to significant advances in medical treatments for all plaintiffs or their families and children, ultimately assuring needs of survival through good health via uses of medical information from the alleged absent court records, or indirectly at least, verifying the records relation to potential medical treatment by COUNTY appearance with the associated arrest and booking records subpoenaed in 1998.

10. Many civil rights and state laws, and laws of due process in Plaintiff BROWNS legal actions effecting CO plaintiffs families over all well being have been violated. Federal laws of freedom of information have also been violated by Defendant when plaintiff Brown attempted to initiate experimental treatments through the county mental health department with the directors support; these violations motivate all plaintiffs to seek specific performance relative to the authority of the federal court in aid of its jurisdiction over civil rights to compel conformance with California state laws of record keeping by defendants, and enforce federal laws of freedom of information, 5 U.S.C. § 552, Amd. Public Law No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048,(2) (C) manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public; in this case procedures and development of feasible, accepted medical treatments, for the public benefit, under the authority of the above cited United States codes.

 

IV. PARTIES

11. Plaintiff CHRISTOPHER A. BROWN is an unmarried man and at all times pertinent to this complaint was a resident of the County of Santa Barbara

12. Plaintiff KATHLEEN OUSEY is an unmarried woman and at all times pertinent to this complaint was a resident of the County of Santa Barbara

13. Plaintiff LINDA RUIZ is an unmarried woman and at all times pertinent to this complaint was a resident of the County of Santa Barbara

14. Plaintiff M.C. is a married woman and at all times pertinant to this complaint was a resident of the County of Santa Barbara.

 15. Defendant COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA (hereinafter "COUNTY") is a duly constituted governmental entity in the state of California and is at all time relevant to this complaint, the employer of defendants County Counsel, SHANE STARK, SUPERVISOR SUSAN ROSE, District Attorney THOMAS SNEDDON, Public Defender JAMES EGAR, Commissioner COLLEEN STERNE and as yet unidentified individual employees designated as DOES 1-10

 16. As a COUNTY supervisor and Defendants supervisor, Defendant SUSAN ROSE (hereinafter, ROSE) is a board member responsible for appointment, supervision, discipline and dismissal. As an elected official, supervisor ROSE may be accurately considered a decision maker for the Defendant COUNTY. ROSE is considered a part of the conspiracy alleged in this complaint.

 17. COUNTY Counsel SHANE STARK (hereinafter "STARK") is an employee of the COUNTY has a responsibility to provide counsel to the COUNTY supervisors and other departments and a duty to the public to oversee the legal affairs of the COUNTY in accord with public safety and interest. He may be accurately considered a decision maker for the Defendant County. STARK is considered a part of the conspiracy alleged in this complaint.

 18. District Attorney, THOMAS SNEDDON (hereinafter "SNEDDON") is an employee of the Defendant and responsible for the hiring, training, retention, supervision, discipline, retraining and dismissal of the District Attorneys Office. As an elected official and District Attorney for the Defendant COUNTY he may be accurately considered a decision maker for the Defendant County. SNEDDON is considered a part of the conspiracy alleged in this complaint.

 19. Deputy District Attorney, KELLY MCLAUCHLIN (hereinafter "MCLAUCHLIN ") is an employee of the Defendant and responsible for constitutional conduct as an attorney for the Defendant COUNTY and knew of, or should have known of the civil rights violations and is considered a part of the conspiracy alleged in this complaint.

20. Commissioner COLLEEN STERNE, (herinafter "STERNE") is an employee of the Defendant and responsible as a magistrate or officer of the court to observe the US Constitution. As an elected official and court official for the Defendant COUNTY she may be accurately considered a decision maker for the Defendant County. STERNE is considered a part of the conspiracy alleged in this complaint.

 21. Public Defender JAMES EGAR, (hereinafter "EGAR") is an employee of the Defendant and responsible for the hiring, training, retention, supervision, discipline, retraining and dismissal of the Public Defenders Office. As an elected official and Public Defender for the Defendant COUNTY he may be accurately considered a decision maker for the Defendant County. EGAR is considered a part of the conspiracy alleged in this complaint.

 22. Deputy Public Defender RAI MONTES DE OCA, (hereinafter "DE OCA") is an employee of the Defendant and responsible for constitutional conduct as an attorney for the Defendant COUNTY in the publics behalf and knew of the civil rights violations and is considered a part of the conspiracy alleged in this complaint.

 V. FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

23. The events and circumstances giving rise to Plaintiffs causes of action against the defendants commences in time from the point of understanding of the overall impacts of the Defendants actions upon them by the Defendants deprivation of Plaintiff BROWNS civil right to equal protection of law on September 8, 1998. Plaintiff BROWN had subpoenaed arrest and booking records from the county jail and Defendant STARK interfered with a subpoenaed witness causing them to fail to appear under subpoena duces tecum (EXHIBIT FOUR). That failure to appear deprived all plaintiffs of equal protection of law, as the arrest and booking records ultimately provided medical verification, very important to the development of an experimental medical treatment protecting them and their families which also has widespread public benefits. As with Amendment IX to the US Constitution, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." CO Plaintiffs just recently understood how Defendants violations of a citizens rights were damaging them and retain the right to be protected by another citizens reciept of equal protection of law, or recognize damage by the depravation of it.

 VI. VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS.

24. Plaintiff BROWN sought, and found support for the medical treatment; which is unverified, as it would be, by the presence of arrest and booking records not provided on subpoena; from the COUNTY mental health department wherein the senior director and chief medical officer agreed to take a request to the State Mental Health Department, for the treatment considered experimental, to be administered by the COUNTY. Plaintiff Brown was given a letter by the COUNTY mental health (EXHIBIT THREE) department stating these facts and that the State response would be provided in writing. Plaintiff BROWN never received that response, tried through telephone calls and finally through a Freedom of Information Act Request upon ROSE and never received a response to any effort to obtain the answer due, depriving all plaintiffs a second time of equal protection of law and methods to initiate development of appropriate treatments for the public, themselves, family and friends.

 

VII. MEMORANDUM OF LAW

25. Plaintiffs additionally allege unconstitutional failures to supervise, train, discipline and correct under City of Canton against defendants, ROSE, STARKE, SNEDDON, and EGAR, and the COUNTY pursuant to Monell for unconstitutional practices in conspiracy with SNEDDON, STARK, EGAR, STERNE, MCLAUCHLIN, and DE OCA.

 VIII. FACTS OF CAUSE OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION, JUSTIFICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

26. The events and circumstances giving rise to Plaintiff CHRISTOPHER BROWN causes of action against Defendants commences from an event in Santa Barbara County Courts. Defendant STERNE, as Family law commissioner heard a small claims case of $2,040.00 fraud where Plaintiff had prima facie evidence against a defendant. STERNE refused to examine evidence against the defendant and refused to examine Plaintiff BROWNS defenses against the small claims defendants counter claim deciding against Plaintiff and for the counter claim. STERNE then used that judgment to justify filing a DEBTORS EXAMINATION heard on March 30, 2004.

 27. At the DEBTORS EXAMINATION STERNE was presented the evidence from the small claims hearing through a request for judicial notice and admitted that she had not seen the evidence against the small claims defendant of the case heard March 30, 2004. Defendant MCLAUCHLIN witnessed the exchange and had access to the file, wherein as attorney for the COUNTY District attorneys office, knew, or should have known Plaintiffs Constitutional rights had been violated and ceased persecution later, 18 U.S.C., PART I, CHAPTER 13 Sec. 241, by bringing a contempt charge against Plaintiff. Plaintff BROWN had arranged to have witnesses in the courtroom that day.

 28. Since that time Plaintiff BROWN's drivers license has expired and the District Attorney has suspended it for arrearages of child support and has filed an ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FOR CONTEMPT against Plaintiff BROWN to be heard April 14, 2006.

 29. On 11-10-05, Plaintiff BROWN obtained court transcripts of the DEBTORS EXAMINATION (EXHIBIT ONE) to find they have been altered with the inquiry and answer concerning the small claims evidence, civil rights violations, removed. Conspiracy, 14th Amendment 42 U.S.C § 1983 and violation of state law, California Rules of Court, Sec. 30,(3)(vi),(5)(ii)(iii). Under such conditions, on February 13, 2,006 Plaintiff BROWN requested in writing that the deputy public defender make a motion to disqualify STERNE which included a written statement from a witness in court on March 30, 2004, (EXHIBIT TWO) with the altered transcripts attached, and was refused by Deputy PUBLIC DEFENDER, RAI MONTES DE OCA, a motion to disqualify commissioner STERNE. Defendant EGAR is responsible to supervise DE OCA and was also given the written statement.

 IX. FACTS OF CAUSE SUPPORTING CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: PLAINTIFF M.C.

30. To show a pattern and policy of 14th Amendement rights violations justifying injunctive relief, Plaintiff M.C experienced deprivations of due process rights by Defendent COUNTY after an event of unreasonable search and siezure then collusion between Deputy Public Defender MINDY BOULET of the Public Defenders office August 19 2,005 who accepted unverified transcripts of phone conversations from the District Attorneys Office and continued with their use in court despite Plaintiff COUSINS objections to her Public Defender stating that the transcripts were altered. (EXHIBIT FIVE) Later a second transcript appeared which was different, see line 18 (both), (EXHIBIT SIX), neither transcript is correct. Plaintiff was forced to file a NOTICE OF NO CONFIDENCE IN COUNSEL on her own behalf to effect, somewhat, a return to lawful process in the court consisting of a dismissal with a threat of prosecution with charges of perjury from Deputy District Attorney, BRIAN J. COTA.

 31. Plaintiffs allege Plaintiff BROWN has been subjected to civil rights violations, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including malicious prosecution in retaliation, abuse of process, violation of substantive and procedural due process rights, violation of equal protection rights, the assistance of legal counsel and impartial trial pursuant to the 14th and 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff BROWN is known to CO Plaintiffs as an proponent of advanced mental health care, generally, and specifically related to recovery, rehabilitation and prevention of substance abuse damaging families. When Defendant COUNTY failed to appear and did not respond to the FOIA of a citizen it was a direct deprival of information to Plaintiffs. Then the COUNTY used its courts to deprive Plaintiff BROWN of equal protection of law repeatedly and the CO Plaintiffs advocate for effective treatments was damaged, eliminating his ability to help them in obtaining their needs of appropriate medical treatment.

 32. Plaintiffs allege the pattern and policy of discrimination with conspiratorial actions against Plaintiff BROWN, including participating in a code of silence and enforcing a continued code of silence intended to deprive the Plaintiff of facts, legally due, needed to gain legal counsel, medical treatment, recovery from fraud, develop medical treatments and there and other economic gains in a period from 1997 through the Debtors Examination of March 30, 2004, to the present; and that none have taken actions to withdraw from the conspiracy and plaintiffs assert that continued deprivations of U.S Constitutional right are inevitable.

 X. APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

33. The plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded because it is shown in the complaint, by its declaration and evidence that the continued act of adjudication by the Santa Barbara Superior Court will produce irreparable harm to the plaintiff as a party in the action of the administrative courts of the defendant and therefore indirectly to all Plaintiss and the public.

 XI. REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

34. Plaintiff BROWN, having filed a complaint for injunctive and other equitable relief in this matter pursuant to TITLE 42, U.S.C. Sec. 1983, moves for a temporary restraining order and for an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted pursuant to Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and once the Court has considered the complaint declarations, exhibit and memorandum of law filed in support thereof, and it finds that: This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of civil rights of this case in "Aid of It's Jurisdiction", and there is good cause to believe that it will have jurisdiction of all parties hereto; There is good cause to believe that defendants the COUNTY and its various officers, ROSE, STARKE, EGAR, STERNE, SNEDDON, MCLAUCHLIN, EGAR and DE OCA will engage in acts and practices that violate TITLE 42, U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and TITLE 18 U.S.C., PART I, CHAPTER 13 Sec. 241. and Sec. 242 of that chapter, and that the plaintiffs are therefore likely to prevail on the merits of this action; There is good cause to believe that immediate and irreparable damage to the Courts ability to grant effective final relief will result from the continued acts of un Constitutional adjudication by the Santa Barbara Superior Court and will produce irreparable harm to the plaintiff as a party in the action of the administrative courts of the defendant, unless the defendants are immediately restrained and enjoined by Order of this Court until its jurisdiction of civil rights is established and controlling the COUNTY courts.

 XII. COMPLAINT BY PLAINTIFF BROWN FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF COUNTY TO RESTORE DAMAGE FROM DEFENDANTS DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS.

35. Defendants deprivation of Plaintiff BROWNS 14th Amendment rights have caused $150,000 in frauds to go un recovered by him. The COUNTY failure to appear in 1998 deprived Plaintiff of large commercial gains and information providing the basis for medical treatment from subpoenaed records, preventing much damage, also having commercial value. Had the Defendants performed their duties as required, Plaintiffs child support arrears would have been paid years ago and no justification to suspend his drivers license would exist. To cease damaging Plaintiff BROWN, the Defendants of the Santa Barbara COUNTY District Attorneys office must perform immediate reparative duties and send a "Release Letter" to the California State Department Of Motor Vehicles reinstating Plaintiff BROWNS privilege to drive.

 36. Plaintiff BROWN demands (1) that defendant be required specifically to perform said duties by the production of an order to the Defendant SNEDDON and Deputy District Attorney KELLY MCLAUCHLIN.

 XIII. DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

AND ORDER FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

37. I, of the undersigned have seen evidence, documents produced by Santa Barbara County Superior Courts in the legal actions of Christopher A. Brown in his efforts to gain County accountability and conformance to state laws of record keeping, subpoena, and mental health care, that demonstrate egregious uses of power, that appear to deprive all of us of the rights of equal protection of law granted to citizens by the US Constitution. We recognize, now, that our equal protection of law was violated on September 8, 1998 when we were indirectly deprived of medical information subpoenaed by Christopher A. Brown that would protect us, our families, friends and the public at large. We recognize that the Freedom of Information Act was violated in direct relation to development of more effective medical treatments of mental health care that would protect us and our families.

We recognize that Christopher A. Brown has been the sole proponent for the medical treatment we now understand as vitally needed for many of our family members and that the County of Santa Barbara has violated the mentioned laws and has suspended his drivers license, and now attempts to ajudicate that he is in contempt in a court, shows us a pattern of violating our Constitutional right repeatedly, and that the Public Defender appointed will not acknowledge the prejudice and act accordingly. Federal injunctive relief can protect his rights, our rights, and violations seen, indicate we have all been deprived. Shown this pattern of rights violations over 9 years, we believe the County Of Santa Barbara is using their authority to damage Christopher Brown and disable him from efforts of gaining legal accountability for record keeping and developing associated medical treatment;

and that he has been damaged and will continue to be damaged by the COUNTY without the requested intervention. We make this Declaration in support of the application for injunctive relief in protection of the original proponent of this appropriate medical treatment, and request with him, an order of specific performance.

The undersigned Declare under penalty of the laws of perjury of the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date ______________________________________________ Linda Ruiz

Date ______________________________________________ M.C.

Date ______________________________________________ Kathleen Ouzey

 XIV. QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES

38. Plaintiff BROWN satisfies the requirements of "QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES" 28 CFR t 35, App A§35.104;pt36,A pp B §36104, being diagnosed with ADHD, justifying REASONABLE MODIFICATIONS 28 CFR §35.130 by a PUBLIC ENTITY, 42 USC §12131, courts are considered public entities. Plaintiffs request REASONABLE MODIFICATIONS and observance of F.R.Civ.P. 61. Harmless Error, by balancing the deprived rights of plaintiffs, against minor deficiencies, errors and ommisions of this complaint and other pleadings in this action that may effect Defendants rights . Plaintiffs seek legal counsel.

 XV. COMPLAINT BY ALL PLAINTIFFS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF COUNTY DUTY TO PROVIDE COMPETENT MEDICAL TREATMENTS

 39. On or about December 1, 2,005 Plaintiff BROWN informed Plaintiffs COUSINS and RUIZ of the COUNTY's failure to appear on subpoena of September 8, 1998 Pursuant to CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 1985.1, any failure to appear pursuant to such agreement may be punished as a contempt by the court issuing the subpoena. Plaintiff BROWN and all citizens were deprived of the protection of that law.

 40. Defendants had a duty to appear and failed, or interfered with the appearance of witness and evidence and this was proven to the magistrate of the State court of the COUNTY at trial in 1998. Plaintiff BROWN had a letter (EXHIBIT FOUR) from the subpoenaed employee of the COUNTY and the letter identifies Defendant STARKE as having interfered with appearance on subpoena. Plaintiff BROWN requested that the court find the subpoenaed witness of the COUNTY in contempt and was denied. All plaintiffs rely on the letter to evidence the failure to appear as well as Defendant STARKES culpability in the deprivation of plaintiffs Constitutional rights.

 41. The failure to appear on subpoena by the Defendant COUNTY and individual defendants intrinsic to the conspiracy relating to the Defendants motives in continued violation of State laws, is evasion of duty or conformance with California State law, or the provisions of CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY code § 1370.4, then Defendant continued to act against the Plaintiffs rights. When Plaintiff BROWN began to bring the COUNTY into compliance with that law in presenting the issue of developing appropriate treatments to the Mental Health Department, then with his FOIA request of 2000 where defendant refused to act according to Federal Freedom of Information Laws, by default refusing to begin an appropriate health care service plan providing an external, independent review process to examine the COUNTY plan's coverage of decisions regarding experimental or investigational therapies presented to officers of the COUNTY medical departments by Plaintiff BROWN in 1999 and supported with their willingness to seek permission from higher authority to administer those treatments which is evidenced by a letter (EXHIBIT THREE) from the Senior Director of the COUNTY Mental Health Department.

 42. The duty of the COUNTY was to appear on subpoena with the records. Pursuant of CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY code § 1370.4, as it might proceed, Plaintiffs would have opportunity to question the original subpoenaed witness and review the records if they are in the Defendants possession. Upon timely evaluation of the testimony and the import of the records, if existent, the Plaintiffs, with expert guidance and testimony per the above mentioned State code, the Defendants lawful guide for performance, could determine what acceptable performance is and who shall do it as agreed upon with Plaintiffs, in, and as ordered by this court.

 42. Plaintiffs demand (1) that defendant be required specifically to perform said duties, (2) or co operate with Plaintiffs through the creation of a non profit corporation to develop appropriate treatments specific to historic needs of Plaintiffs and the general public, which the Defendant County can fund through court ordered payments of up to 20 million dollars

over 5 years time. (3) that if specific performance is not granted, plaintiffs have judgment against defendant to effect equitable relief in the sum of 2.5 million dollars for intitial development of treatments making them available to private use by development of refined procedure and then application with qualified experts and specialists to the public by the public for further development.

 XVI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

43. Wherefore Plaintiffs pray for the following relief.

 1. Injunctive relief as applied for restraining Defendants as corrective action in aid of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in Santa Barbara County.

 2. An order for specific performance to the Defendants District Attorneys as requested.

 3. Orders as needed, to be defined, compelling specific performance to gain information due by law from Defendants and cooperation towards development of appropriate medical treatments pursuant to state law.

 4. For reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if representation is found.

 Respectfully submitted,

Date;

 Pro se plaintiff, Christopher Brown

 Pro se plaintiff, M.C.

 Pro se plaintiff, Linda Ruiz

 Pro se plaintiff, Kathleen Ouzey

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